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ABSTRACT 
Multiple perceptions of Opportunity and Threat and Coalitional Dynamics in the Iranian Reform 
Movement (1997-2005) 
(Under the direction of Charles Kurzman) 
 
After social movements emerge, different actors within the movements usually take different 
trajectories. To understand these different trajectories, one needs to understand how these actors 
assess the political context. Different assessments of the political context imply different strategic 
choices. Also, converging and diverging assessments are part of the formation and disintegration of 
coalitions within social movements. I use the Iranian reform movement (1997-2005) to test my 
argument, since it contained multiple actors, changing coalitions, and diachronic as well as 
synchronic variations in the assessments of the political context. 
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Introduction 
Shifts in the configurations of political opportunities and threats would not matter for social 
movements, unless perceived, interpreted, or attributed by contenders1. While this statement is now 
widely shared in social movement theory, the case of multiple perceptions of opportunity and threat 
within the same time and the same movement has been downplayed. As scholars of social movements 
debate over different dimensions of this concept in general and its configurations and ramifications in 
particular cases, social movement actors as well assess the political context in different ways. As 
scholars develop different theories of opportunity and threat, actors’ perceptions of opportunity and 
threat also involve different theories of history and sociopolitical change. In a sense then social 
movement actors engage in an intellectual enterprise somewhat equivalent to social movement 
scholars. Finally, multiple perceptions of opportunity and threat matter for different kinds of activism 
and social movement coalitions. Different assessments of context imply different strategic choices, 
and converging and diverging perceptions of opportunity and threat are part of the formation and 
disintegration of coalitions within social movements. The case of the Iranian reform movement 
(1997-2005) appear a suitable case to study multiple perceptions and their implications, inasmuch as 
it is a case with shifting configurations of opportunity and threat, different actors within the 
movement, synchronic and diachronic variation in perceptions of opportunity and threat, and 
changing coalitions within the movement. I shall argue that one cannot understand the changing 
coalitions within the movement unless taking into account the changing landscape of the perceptions 
of opportunity and threat within the movement.
                                                          
1
 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
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Political events are usually vague and open to interpretation. These events also reflect different 
dimensions of the political context. If actors interpret any dimension of the political context 
differently, the overall perception would be different. The receptiveness of incumbent elite, the 
openness of the institutionalized politics, and the opportunity for mass mobilizations are three 
dimensions of the political context among others. Having a contrasting take on any of these three 
dimensions then makes an overall different assessment of the political context. Finally, actors are not 
passive receiver of the changes or continuities within the political context. Instead, they are active 
interpreters of their environment. These factors all help us understand it better why multiple 
perceptions of opportunity and threat can be the case in social movements. 
Perceptions of opportunity and threat engage theories of sociopolitical change. Movement actors in 
many occasions care about theories of sociopolitical change. They try to come up with a better 
judgment about their context, and for this goal familiarize themselves with theories crafted by social 
scientists or develop their own theories. A rigid wall that we sometime draw between ourselves and 
social movement activists in fact does not exist in many cases. 
Multiple perceptions of opportunity and threat matter for different ways of activism and coalitions 
within the movement. If part of the movement think there are opportunities within the 
institutionalized politics they might advocate for lobbying or electoral participation, whereas if 
another part of the movement does not see any opportunity in the institutionalized politics but 
perceives opportunities for mass mobilization it would champion tactics of civil disobedience. 
Multiple perceptions of opportunity and threat are also part of the coalitional dynamics within the 
movement. When in a coalition perceptions of opportunity and threat diverge, actors with divergent 
perceptions push for dissimilar strategic moves in different directions which in turn create tensions 
within the coalition and can lead to fractures and disintegration of the whole coalition. Likewise, 
when perceptions of opportunity and threat converges actors with dissimilar background or identities 
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favor similar strategic moves. Taking similar strategic trajectories then, these actors may forge new 
coalitions. 
The Iranian Reform movement was an attempt to democratize the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) 
between 1997 and 2005. The movement contained four types of actors, a clerical reformist party, lay 
reformist parties, the student movement, and opposition groups. The main coalition in the movement 
was between the first three groups. These groups all shared the same perception of opportunity and 
threat. This perception involved optimism toward the incumbent elite of IRI, optimism toward the 
institutional arrangements of IRI, and pessimism about the costs and percussions of mass 
mobilization. Opposition groups though were less optimistic toward elite and institutionalized politics 
and had a bigger emphasis on grass-roots protest activities. During later developments within the 
movement though the main student organization lost its optimism in the IRI and incumbent elite and 
institutional arrangements and left the coalition. Lay reformist parties dropped optimism toward 
incumbent elite whereas kept its optimism toward institutions. Clerical reformist party though kept 
their position toward elites, institutions, and mass mobilization. In 2005, the coalitional configuration 
then totally changed; the former coalition was totally disintegrated and a new coalition between lay 
reformist parties and opposition groups formed. I shall argue that diverging perceptions were part of 
that disintegration and converging perceptions were part of the newly formed coalition within the 
reform movement. 
In what follows, I will engage with theories of political opportunities, theory-ladenness of 
perceptions, and coalitions in three sections develop my theoretical argument. Then I will introduce 
my case, main actors and main perceptions of opportunities and threat within my case, and my data. 
In the next section, I will trace the four actors, their perceptions, strategic moves, and coalitions 
during the major junctures during the eight years of the reform movement. The paper will end with a 
conclusion. 
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Literature Review and Theoretical Discussion 
Multiple Perceptions of Opportunity and Threat 
The concept of political opportunities has been a focal concept in social movement studies during last 
three decades. These attributes of the political context are defined as specified as the relative 
openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the stability or instability of elite 
alignments, the presence or absence of elite allies, and the state capacity or propensity for repression2. 
Studies employing this concept all build on the premise that  changes in particular features in the 
political environment of a movement can explain the mobilization, claims, strategic choices, 
alliances, developments, and outcomes of a movement3. 
It is now widely accepted in the social movement literature that there is a subjective side to political 
opportunities4. To be effective then, an objective political opportunity should be perceived by social 
movement actors. Framing is a concept that has been deployed to capture the subjective dimension of 
political opportunities5. As a concept that for a while was supposed to deal with the cultural aspects of 
                                                          
2
 Doug McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions," in Comparative Perspectives on 
Social Movements : Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, eds. Doug 
McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge England ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
3
 P. K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," The American Political Science 
Review 67, no. 1 (1973), 11.; Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-
Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies," British Journal of Political Science 16, no. 1 (Jan., 1986), 57-85.; 
Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1999).; David S. Meyer, "Protest and Political Opportunities," Annual Review of Sociology 
30, no. 1 (08/01, 2004), 125-145. 
4
 Charles C. Kurzman, "Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The 
Iranian Revolution of 1979," American Sociological Review 61, no. 1 (1996), 153.; Charles Kurzman, "The 
Poststructuralist Consensus in Social Movement Theory," in Rethinking Social Movements; Structure, Meaning, 
and Emotions, eds. Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper (New York: Row Man & Littlefield Publishers, INC, 
2004).; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention; D. Suh, "How do Political Opportunities Matter 
for Social Movements?: Political Opportunity, Misframing, Pseudosuccess, and Pseudofailure," Sociological 
Quarterly 42, no. 3 (2001), 437. 
5
 William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, "Framing Political Opportunities," in Comparative Perspectives on 
Social Movements : Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, eds. Doug 
McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge England ;New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996).; Lisa L. Kowalchuk, "THE DISCOURSE OF DEMOBILIZATION: Shifts in Activist Priorities and the 
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protest in Political Process Model, framing was defined as “the conscious strategic efforts by groups 
of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and 
motivate collective action”6. 
Whereas studies that focused on framing political opportunities have somewhat expanded our 
knowledge about the subjective aspects of the political opportunity concept, the notion of framing and 
its application in the case of the political opportunities might be considered problematic in two 
aspects. First, framing has been conceptualized as a strategic process in which movements try to 
legitimize their action and recruit more supporters. Thus, framing political opportunities would be 
about the ways movement activists strategically describe the political context to attract more people 
and resources to the movement and to legitimize their cause. However, other than strategically 
depicting political opportunities, social movement actors are also genuinely engaged in understanding 
and defining the political context and the moment for themselves. This cognitive process of 
identifying political opportunities is not being adequately addressed under the concept of framing. As 
James Jasper suggests it might be more beneficial to limit framing concept to the process of 
recruitment and use other concepts to examine other cultural and subjective dimensions of protest, 
instead of stretching the concept of framing and lumping all cultural and subjective processes under 
this category7. 
Aside from framing, terms such as the perception8 of political opportunity and cognitive liberation 
have been also utilized to highlight the subjective aspects of the phenomena.  It has been argued that, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Framing of Political Opportunities in a Peasant Land Struggle," Sociological Quarterly 46, no. 2 (2005), 237-
261. 
6
 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements : 
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge England ;New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).p.6 
7
 James M. Jasper 1957-, The Art of Moral Protest : Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). p. 49. 
8
 Kurzman, The Poststructuralist Consensus in Social Movement Theory 
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in order to be effective, opportunities and threats should be first perceived by actors9. McAdam labels 
this subjective process of identifying political opportunities “cognitive liberation”: “before collective 
protest can get under way, people must collectively define their situations as unjust and subject to 
change through group action”10.  
In this account, first objective changes occur in the structure of the political opportunities; second, 
actors may perceive changes; finally, if actors accurately perceived the changes they get mobilized. 
Thus, after a change occurs in the political opportunity structure, there are only two possibilities about 
how actors may perceive them. Either actors perceive the opportunities or act upon them, or they 
simply do not see the opportunities. For example, McAdam argues that shifts in the political structure 
gives a structural potential for collective action, and then the question is whether the shifts will be 
defined as such or not by potential protestors11. Likewise, it has also been suggested that there are two 
kinds of actors: rational actors who see opportunities and threats as they are and actors with more 
emphasis on religious belief or identity issues who disregard these objective factors12. Sydney Tarrow 
says that “movements that privilege identity ignore opportunities.” And Charles Brocket states that 
“as analysts, we want to know how accurately activists perceive their context.” The question here 
then is whether actors ignore opportunities or not; and if they see them how accurate they perceive 
them. In these accounts, there is no room for protestors to shape their perceptions and so there is no 
possibility of a third, where a subset of movement actors sees the opportunities and threats in one way 
while other actors see them quite differently.  
                                                          
9
 McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention 
10
 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 p.51 
11
 Ibid. p. 48 
12Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge, U.K. ;New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).;{{David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier and Belinda Robnett, Social 
Movements : Identity, Culture, and the State (Oxford ;New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).}}. Eitan Y. 
Alimi, "Mobilizing Under the Gun: Theorizing Political Opportunity Structure in a Highly Repressive Setting," 
Mobilization (San Diego, Calif.) 14, no. 2 (2009), 219. 
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The other important point about McAdam’s concept of cognitive liberation is that he takes into 
account the variation of perceptions of political opportunity within time. In this sense, he offers a 
dynamic view toward perceptions. Nonetheless, he contends that this variation can be explained by 
the changes in the political context and mobilizing structure. Accordingly, the perceptions again get 
reduced to a structural factor such as political opportunity structure, and no room gets left for 
perceptions as an independent  
To go beyond the question of ignorance or accuracy, and in order not to reduce the subjective aspect 
to structural factors, I suggest looking at movement actors as painters who depict a scene on their 
canvas while reshaping and reprocessing the scene in their mind and through their artistic tastes. 
Looking at perceptions in this way enables us to understand the possible plurality and diversity of the 
perceptions more than the dichotomous approach. 
While the political context of the movement and its organizational structure are significant in shaping 
this disagreement, one can argue it is also important that in fact there different ways of assessing 
opportunities and threats, ways that are relatively independent from mobilizing structures and 
objective political opportunities. What attracts more attention to these different subjective ways is the 
point that the impacts of the objective factors such as institutions or repression do not shape the 
behavior of all the actors consistently and in the same way. While political process theory puts the 
main emphasis on political institutions in shaping the trajectories of the movement actors, the fact that 
different actors may react differently to the same institutional rewards and sanctions within the same 
time and context within the same social movement presents a challenge to a structuralist position. To 
borrow from Bruno Latour’s terms, the critical point here is whether to count actors as intermediaries 
or mediators: 
“An intermediary, in my vocabulary, is what transports meaning or force without transformation: 
defining its inputs is enough to define its outputs…” while the output of mediators “is never a good 
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predictor of their output; their specificity has to be taken into account every time… Mediators 
transform, translate, distort and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry”13. 
Applying this distinction to the perceptions of opportunity and threat, one can argue that contextual 
factors such as institutional position or repression affect these perceptions, but given these objective 
factors per se as the input, one cannot predict perceptions as the output. Actors’ perceptions are not 
the automatic outcome of what institutions do to them. The agency and subjectivity of the movement 
actors mediate the contextual factors and actors’ perceptions, and we still need to deepen our concept 
of perceived opportunity and threat. 
So far I argued that we need to conceive actors active in their perceptions and not to totally reduce 
these perceptions to contextual factors. It was also mentioned that recognizing the relative 
independence importance of perceptions, we would be able to better apprehend cases of multiple 
perceptions of opportunity and threat within a movement. There are also two other factors that help us 
understand why multiple perceptions of political opportunity might be sometime the case in some 
social movements. First, social movement actors do not observe features of political opportunity such 
as the availability of elite allies or the propensity of the state for repression, but based on different 
events they try to come up with some general conclusions about the political context. However, as 
Gamson and Meyer suggest “most events are more ambiguous and leave ample room for 
disagreement about where the best opportunity lie”14. 
Besides, as scholars of social movements distinguish between different dimensions of political 
opportunities and threats15, movement actors as well deal with different elements in the political 
context. It might be the case that movement actors agree on some elements for example the relative 
openness of the institutionalized politics, but not the propensity of state for repression. Thus 
                                                          
13
 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social : An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford ;New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). P. 39. 
14
 Gamson and Meyer, Framing Political Opportunities p. 284 
15
 Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
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complexity of political context and multidimensionality of perceptions of opportunity and threat are 
another factor that contributes to multiplicity of perceptions of opportunity and threat in some cases. 
Inasmuch as actors are active in perceiving opportunity and threat within their political context, 
ramifications of political events are usually vague, and perceptions of opportunity and threat are 
multi-dimensional, multiplicity of these perceptions might be the case in social movements. 
Perceptions of opportunity and threat might vary within a movement at the same time or during the 
time. Nonetheless, whereas e defining opportunity and threat has been called the most contentious 
process within social movements16, diachronic and synchronic variation of perceptions have been 
downplayed and are still an unexplored area in social movement studies. 
Movement Actors as Theorists of Political Change and Narrators of Opportunity 
and Threat 
Perceptions of opportunity and threat involve theories of sociopolitical change. It was mentioned that 
movement actors and movement scholars are engaged in a similar enterprise in terms of identifying 
different dimensions of the political context. Employing or developing theories of sociopolitical 
change, movement actors in fact do something somewhat equivalent to movement scholars. 
Activists are not practitioners they are also theorists of activism and change, who also try to explain 
the world17. Movement actors, similar to movement scholars, have theories about social and political 
change and utilize these theories in prioritizing their goals, perceiving threats and opportunities, and 
making strategic choices. Movement actors try to change the status quo into a more desirable 
situation. There are usually different potential strategies to achieve these changes, and actors make 
                                                          
16
 Gamson and Meyer, Framing Political Opportunities 
17
 Lynn Owens, Cracking Under Pressure : Narrating the Decline of the Amsterdam Squatters' Movement 
(University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009).; Sarah Maddison and Sean Scalmer, Activist 
Wisdom : Practical Knowledge and Creative Tension in Social Movements, ed. Sean Scalmer (Sydney: 
University of New South Wales Press, 2006). 
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decisions to choose from these different options. Actors then contemplate about different mechanisms 
that can bring the change. They also deliberate about how they can manipulate the context to trigger 
those mechanisms or facilitate the mechanisms that finally lead to the desirable changes. Theories of 
sociopolitical change, therefore, are ideas that explain to them what the causes of these changes are, 
how these changes happen, how much it is possible for actors to manipulate these mechanisms, and 
how they can manipulate them. One can observe on many occasions that movement activists read 
scholarly theoretical discussions to find the most efficient way to change the status quo to the 
desirable situation18. Actors with different theories, then, see political opportunities and threats 
differently. It is mainly because these different theories frame the political context differently and 
have different criteria to define a political opportunity.  
The subject of perceptions and theories has been profoundly discussed in the philosophy of science. 
Thomas Kuhn, among others, argued that perceptions are theory-laden. Thomas Kuhn argued that 
actors’ observations cannot be separated from their paradigms. He maintained that actors with 
different paradigms look at different things. For example if we show a pendulum to an Aristotelian 
and a Newtonian physicist, the former would look at “the weight of the stone, the vertical height to 
which it had been raised, and the time required for it to achieve rest” while the latter would examine 
“radius, angular displacement, and time per swing”19. Besides, building on some psychological tests, 
Kuhn suggests that observers with different conceptual recourses see the objects even differently. 
The historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when paradigms change, the world itself 
changes with them. Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. 
Even more important, during revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking with 
familiar instruments in places they have looked before”20. 
                                                          
18
 Identifying different styles of leadership within Brazilian youth movement, Ann Mische points out to the fact 
these different styles were in fact associated with actors familiarity with and reading of theorists such as 
Gramsci, Habermas, Dewewy, and Machiavelli Ann Mische, Partisan Publics : Communication and Contention 
Across Brazilian Youth Activist Networks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). p.190-1. 
19
 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
20
 Ibid. 
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Kuhn also adds that observers from different paradigms, albeit using the same language, understand 
different meaning from the same terms21. Accordingly, it could be said that perceptions of threats and 
opportunities are theory-laden. Attributing threats and opportunities to the political context involves 
actors’ theories or schemas. They use their historical knowledge of the political context to make sense 
of the current situation to find the openings and constraints on the horizon. They also use their 
understanding of mechanisms of change and the constraints of change to promote their desirable 
change and to overcome obstacles. These theories could be general theories of sociopolitical change, 
historical theories, or particular theories about the characteristics of that particular political context. 
The example of internal debates within the reformist represented by Eduard Bernstein and 
revolutionary wings of the German socialist movement represented by Rosa Luxemburg in the turn of 
the 20th century can better illustrate my point. Bernstein was of the opinion that Marx’ prediction 
about the collapse of capitalism was wrong, a revolution that suddenly improves the situation of all 
society was a doctrinal illusion, and the only hope for socialists was socialization of property through 
democratic institutions. According to Bernstein the good model for Germany was British socialism 
which lacked a revolutionary doctrine but had gained the best achievements. Since he believed that 
socialization through democratic institutions was possible and in fact was happening, he advocated 
parliamentarism and reformist policies such as workers' economic struggles for better conditions, and 
campaigning for democratizing bourgeoisie society.  
On the other hand, Rosa Luxemburg was of the opinion that capitalism would inevitably collapse and 
working class was revolutionary in essence. For her, the Russian Revolution of 1905 was the future 
                                                          
21
 “By the same token, the Copernicans who denied its traditional title ‘planet’ to the sun were not only learning 
what ‘planet’ to the sun were not only learning what ‘planet’ meant or what the sun was. Instead, they were 
changing the meaning of ‘planet’ so that it could continue to make useful distinctions in a world where all 
celestial bodies, not just the sun, were seen differently from the way they had been seen before.  The same point 
could be made about any of our earlier examples. To see oxygen instead of dephlogisticated air, the condenser 
instead of the Leyden jar, or the pendulum instead of constrained fall, was only one part of an integrated shift in 
the scientist’s vision of a great many related chemical, electrical, or dynamical phenomena. Paradigms 
determine large areas of experience at the same time” Ibid. pp.128-129. 
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pattern for Germany and as a result mass strike was the most effective strategy of the working class. 
To her, reform was not a goal for socialists, it was just a means to provide the necessary device for 
the final battle of the proletariat with bourgeoisie22. Whereas Bernstein said “What is generally called 
the ultimate goal of socialism is nothing to me; the movement is everything” 23, Luxemburg stated 
that “The movement as an end in itself, unrelated to the ultimate goal is nothing to me; the ultimate 
goal is everything” 24. In this example Bernestein and reformists saw the opportunity in the 
democratic institutions of the state, whereas for Luxemburg and revolutionary left the main 
opportunity was in the ultimate collapse of capitalism and the essentially revolutionary features of the 
working class. Disagreement between these two figures and their followers did not remain in the 
theoretical realm. The German socialist movement later split between the reformist and revolutionary 
wings25. 
So far my discussion was about movement actors identifying threats and opportunities in the present 
and future. Nonetheless, movement actors also examine threats and opportunity in the recent past of 
the movement to evaluate strategic measures which they took. They would like to know if they took 
opportunities, avoided the threats, or missed the opportunities, or were damaged by actualized threats. 
Employing these categories of taken opportunity, missed opportunity, avoided threat, or actualized 
threat, they evaluate the success and failure of the movement in general. In a sense, movement actors 
                                                          
22
 Leszek Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism : The Founders, the Golden Age, the Breakdown, ed. P. S. 
(Paul Stephen) Falla, Vol. II (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005). pp. 64-82, 99-108. 
23
 Ibid. p. 108. 
24
 Ibid. p. 77. 
25
 Ibid. p. 46. A similar case can be made in reference to internal debate and fissures between integrationist and 
separatists in the US black movements. There were also important theoretical differences within the Black 
Power Movement. In these debates different actors grapple with questions of whether there is any opportunity 
in pursuing demands within American political institutions, whether there is any possibility for change in 
resorting to American public opinion, and other similar questions. See John T. McCartney, Black Power 
Ideologies : An Essay in African-American Political Thought (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992). 
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tell narratives of opportunity and threat to present their appraisal of the success and failure of the 
movement.  
Activists’ narratives and stories, their emergence, and their impacts have recently attracted attention 
in social movement studies26. While the importance of these narratives in social movement has been 
admitted, it has been also maintained that the mode of narratives is different from the mode of 
scientific paradigms and movement stories are dissimilar to scientific explanations27.  
However, I argue that in some occasion actors’ narratives of opportunity and threat are somewhat 
equivalent to scholars’ narratives of success or failure of social movements based on their 
opportunities and threats. As scholars explore success or failure of movements according to their 
conceptualization and operationalization of opportunities and threats, movement actors as well, 
movement actors as well narrate the stories of success and failure within their general schemas 
through which they assess the context. I call these general schemas strategic paradigms. Strategic 
paradigms are certain ways of assessing the political context, crafting strategies, and reflecting on the 
recent past of the movement. 
Multiple Perceptions and Coalitional Dynamics 
Multiple perceptions of opportunity and threat matter for different strategic choices and coalitional 
dynamics within social movements. Whether movements to insider tactics such as lobbying or 
electoral participation, or outsider peaceful tactics such as civil disobedience, or even violent tactics 
                                                          
26
 Francesca Polletta, It was Like a Fever : Storytelling in Protest and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2006).; Charles Tilly, Stories, Identities, and Political Change (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2002).; Owens, Cracking Under Pressure : Narrating the Decline of the Amsterdam Squatters' Movement; 
Culture, Social Movements, and Protest, ed. Hank Johnston (Farnham, England ;Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2009).; Stories of Change : Narrative and Social Movements, ed. Joseph E. Davis (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2002). 
27
 Tilly, Stories, Identities, and Political Change; Polletta, It was Like a Fever : Storytelling in Protest and 
Politics 
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such as arm struggle, or passive revolutionary tactics such as Gramscian discursive positioning 
somewhat depend on perceptions of threat and opportunity28.  
For instance, if one considers three different dimensions of the political context, receptiveness of 
incumbent elite, relative openness of institutionalized politics, and opportunity for mass mobilization, 
one can come up at least five strategies among others, based on different perceptions of these three 
dimensions29: 
Insider Discursive strategy. If one perceives the incumbent elite receptive toward movement 
demands, perceives the institutionalized politics relatively open, but perceives the situation 
unfavorable for mass mobilization, one may conclude that movement should follow its demands 
through dialogue, bargaining and negotiation with incumbent elite through political institutions. 
Institutional strategy. If the incumbent elite is perceived as resistant toward movement’s demands, 
and no opportunity seems available for mass mobilization, but institutionalized politics appear 
receptive toward the movement, one can conclude that is would be beneficial to challenge the 
incumbent elite through political institutions. 
Activist Strategy. If one’s assessment is that the incumbent elite and institutional politics would not be 
receptive toward demands unless there is pressure from below, and there is opportunity to mobilize 
social support, the one can strategize to use both insider and outsider tactics. 
Active Radical Strategy. If one comes with the conclusion that the incumbent elite is resistant toward 
the movement demands and institutionalized politics is closed, but there is opportunity for mass 
mobilization, one can follow that outsider tactics such as civic disobedience should be on the agenda. 
                                                          
28
 Gamson and Meyer, Framing Political Opportunities 
29
 Here I do not mean that other factors such as emotions or moral convictions do not matter in strategizing. By 
the example of these different strategies, I am just trying to illustrate how perceptions of political context matter 
in strategic choices. 
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Passive Radical Strategy. Finally, if one sees incumbent elite hostile, institutionalized politics closed, 
and conditions for mass mobilization calamitous, one may adhere go for tactics of seizing hard and 
minds and expanding the movement networks until the right moment arrives. 
 Other than strategizing, multiple perceptions of opportunity and threat also matter for coalitions 
within a social movement. It is now widely accepted that social movements are not monolithic but 
fields of different actors. Coalitions between these different actors have been the subject of inquiry in 
social movement studies.  
Ideological similarity compatibility and convergence30, the role of symbols and political discourses31, 
political culture32, bonds of obligation and responsibility33, social ties and brokers34, decentralized 
organizational structure35, and organizational formalization and professionalization36 are among major 
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factors that have been found to have constitutive or facilitative impact on coalition building in social 
movements.  
In addition to these factors, a considerable portion of the literature about coalitions within social 
movement is devoted to the explanatory role of political opportunity and threats. However, there is no 
agreement on whether opportunities or threats are more conducive to the formation of coalitions. On 
the one hand some scholars argue that with emergence of political opportunities or in favorable 
contexts coalitions are more likely to form37. On the other hand, it has been argued that political 
opportunities either do not matter or even undermine coalitions, whereas the emergence of threats 
encourages actors to cooperate and form coalitions38. There is also a third position demonstrating that 
a combination of opportunities and threats promoted the coalition formation in the case of the Latin 
American Social movements and oppositional parties39. 
One important point about these works and this debate is that the subjective aspect of political 
opportunities and threats is again downplayed here. In fact, while the subjective aspect is recognized 
theoretically it is still being ignored in the application of the concept. The fact that favorable and 
unfavorable contexts do not consistently affect coalition-building is to a certain degree due to 
different assessment of actors of the political context. This is the actors’ assessments that mediate 
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between changes in the political context and their decision about forming, maintaining, or exiting 
from a coalition, and without taking into account these perceptions we cannot understand the 
processes of coalition formation well.  
Another point about the literature about social movement coalitions is that it has been limited to the 
emergence of coalitions and the processes of coalition disintegration and fragmentation have not been 
addressed. Sydney Tarrow’s and Ruud Koopmans’ works on cycles of contention, though, address the 
splits and fragmentation within social movements. Tarrow contends that selective repression and 
facilitation by government split off moderates from radicals40. Koopmans also argues that lack of 
success might reinforce tensions within moderates and radicals. Success brings different factions in a 
peaceful coexistence, and strategic debates erupt when things go wrong41. Accordingly, Koopman 
points how changes in the political context trigger strategic debates within social movements, he does 
not explore how these processes play out on the ground42. 
One aspect of this strategic debate is about political opportunities and threats. Actors discuss over 
whether the lack of failure is because of the contextual constraints or wrong strategies taken by the 
movement. Actors then present their narratives of opportunity and threat to respond to these issues. 
They also try to update their strategic paradigms, justify them, or even totally reject them or come up 
with a new one.  
If one looks at these strategic debates through time and put them in motion, one can see that multiple 
perceptions may converge or diverge. Converging and diverging perceptions of opportunities and 
threats are part of the formation or disintegration of coalitions within social movements. 
Disagreements over these perceptions may contribute to rifts and fractures within a movement, and 
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convergence over these perceptions can bring together movement actors who have been at odds with 
each other. Actors who do not share the same identity or world views may ally, as their similar 
perceptions about opportunities and threats could be a part of this alliance formation. On the other 
hand, actors with common values and identities may come to different assessments of the political 
context and this could fuel the collapse or disintegration of their alliance. 
Case and Data 
In two respects, the Iranian Reform Movement seems a good opportunity to examine the complexity 
and importance of the different perceptions of opportunities and threats. Similar to many other social 
movements this movement also included different sets of actors. Movement witnessed two phases. In 
the first phase, most of the actors agreed upon one set of perceptions of the political context. In the 
second phase, the crackdown on the movement was severed. Some actors kept their previous 
perceptions of the political context, some modified their previous assessments, and some came up 
with a totally new paradigm. Indeed, different ways of assessing political context existed or emerged 
within the life of the movement. Moreover, the coalitions within the movement within the first phase 
changed dramatically within the second phase. In this section, I introduce these actors within the 
movement and different perceptions of threat and opportunity in the life of the movement. Finally, I 
will introduce my data. 
Reformist Actors 
Iranian reform movement consisted of actors who sought to democratize the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
IRI was a political regime that came to power in Iran after the popular revolution of 1979. This 
regime has been a combination of republican institutions such as presidency, parliament, and 
municipalities, and revolutionary or religious institutions such as the Leader and the Guardian 
Council. While republican institutions control some portion of power in Iran, religious and 
revolutionary institutions have had the upper hand both on the paper and in the reality. For example, 
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Leader as a non-elected office-holder controls armed forces, National Radio and TV, and directly and 
indirectly appoints the members of the Guardian Council. Guardian Council has discretionary 
supervision over all elections in Iran, and enjoys veto power over all parliamentary enactments. The 
reform movement was an attempt to empower republican institutions within IRI.  
Political actors within the reform movement can be roughly classified to four sets: a reformist clerical 
party, reformist lay parties, student movement, and opposition groups43. 
Reformist Clerical Party. The Assembly of Militant Clerics, the main reformist Clerical party, was 
founded in 1988. In the factional politics of IRI, the Assembly belonged to the Left wing. They 
advocated state intervention in economy and taking a radical anti-imperialist position in foreign 
policy. While they managed to achieve the majority seats in the third parliament (1988-1992) most of 
their candidates were disqualified by the Guardian Council in 1992 parliamentary election. In the 
1990s they gradually modified their political views and put more emphasis on the popular sovereignty 
and the right of people in their discourse. In 1997, Mohammad Khatami, a leading member of the 
group won the presidential election and this brought the Assembly again back in the center of the 
stage. Later with the landslide victory of reformists in 1999 parliamentary election, Mahdi Karrubi, 
another prominent member of the group by the time, became the speaker of the parliament. 
Reformist Lay Parties. Participation Party and the Organization of Mujahidin were two major 
reformist political parties. Similar to the Assembly, Organization of Mujahidin was also a part of the 
IRI left wing in 1980s and was excluded from the parliament and the executive in early 1990s. They 
also transformed then their leftist and radical views toward more democratic themes. In 1997 
presidential election they backed Khatami, and after the landslide victory of the reformist in 1999 
parliamentary election, two prominent members of the group became the second and the third 
speakers of the parliament (2000-2004).  
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Participation Party was formed in 1998 out of high staff members in Khatami’s presidential campaign 
in 1997. Participation front very soon managed to become the biggest reformist party. it had the 
biggest fraction in the 6th parliament (2000-2004), and many of its members served as minister 
deputies in Khatami’s cabinet. 
Table 1 
Reformist Actors 
 
 Clerical 
Reformist 
Party 
Lay Reformist Parties Student 
Movement 
Opposition Groups 
Persian 
Name 
Majma’e 
Rohaniyun-
e Mobarez 
Sazman-e 
Mojahedin-e 
Enqelab-e 
Eslami-ye 
Iran 
Jebheye 
Mosharekat-
e Iran-e 
Eslami 
Daftar-e 
Tahkim-e 
Vahdat 
Nehzat-e 
Azadi-ye 
Iran 
Fa’alan-e 
Melli 
Mazhabi 
English 
Name 
Assembly 
of Militant 
Clerics 
The 
Organizatio
n of the 
Mujahidin 
of the 
Islamic 
Revolution 
of Iran 
Islamic Iran 
Participatio
n Front  
The Office 
for 
Strengthenin
g Unity 
Iran 
Liberation 
Movement 
Nationalist
-Religious 
Activists 
The year 
of 
Foundatio
n 
1989 Founded in 
1979 
Dissolved 
once in 1986 
Refounded 
in 1991 
1998 1979 1961  
Prominent 
Members 
Mohamma
d Khatami, 
Mehdi 
Karrubi, 
Mohamma
d Musavi 
Kho’eyniha 
Behzad 
Nabavi, 
Mohsen 
Armin, 
Mohammad 
Salamati 
Mohammad 
Reza 
Khatami, 
Mostafa 
Tajzade, 
Mohsen 
Mirdamadi 
Ali Afshari, 
Reza Hojjati, 
Nima Fateh 
Ebrahim 
Yazdi, 
Mohammad 
Tavassoli, 
Hashem 
Sabbaghiya
n 
Ezzatollah 
Sahabi, 
Habibollah 
Peyman, 
Morteza 
Kazemian 
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Student Movement. Student movement and its main organization, the Unity Office, were active in 
Khatami’s campaign in 1997 and in the later political events. This organization was affiliated with the 
left wing of the IRI in 1980s and functioned as a the regime’s arm to clean university campuses from 
Marxist students in that decade. Nonetheless, with the rise of new intellectual trends in Iran, this 
organization made its discourse more democratic and liberal. Advocating pro-democracy demands, it 
held different gatherings and meetings in university campuses. Students in each university elect the 
members of its Association and then these Associations elect the members of the central committee of 
the Office for Strengthening. 
Opposition Groups. Iran Liberation Movement and Nationalist-Religious Activists are two main 
oppositional groups that also acted as members of the reform movement. Founded in 1961, and 
advocating a liberal ideology the group was opposing the Monarchy before the revolution. At the time 
of the revolution, members of the group formed the interim government, but their moderate 
government resigned in a few month due to the pressures from radical revolutionary groups. This 
group was critical of non-democratic themes and the integration of religious and political institutions 
within IRI constitution from the inception of IRI, and while they had some members in the first 
parliament (1980-1984), they were not allowed to run in any election in 1980s and 1990s.  
The other group Nationalist-Religious Activists shared the pro-democracy stance with the Liberation 
Movement. The main difference between these two groups was that the latter advocated a welfare 
state model in the economy, while the former was more favoring a free-market model. Besides, 
Nationalist-Religious activists had a more critical view toward West in their views about foreign 
policy. 
Reformist Strategic Paradigms 
Discursive Paradigm. This paradigm had an optimistic view toward the incumbent elite, and was of 
the opinion that reformist demands could be met through dialogue and negotiation with the 
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conservative elite. This paradigm also had an optimistic view toward working through governmental 
institutions, and believed that movement would benefit in following its demands through them. Third, 
according to this paradigm mass mobilization would lead to unrest and would give excuses to 
hardliner for cracking down on the movement. There was no opportunity for mass mobilization in this 
paradigm. 
Institutionalist Paradigm. This paradigm shared the second and the third point with the previous 
paradigm. Nonetheless, according to this paradigm incumbent elite would not give way to reform just 
through negotiation and dialogue. The method that would work is to enter governmental institutions 
and to use insider resources to challenge incumbent elite.  
Activist Paradigm. According to this paradigm, mere working through institutions and negotiating 
with elite would not work unless accompanied with pressure from below. Combining insider and 
outsider strategies, the motto of this paradigm was “pressure from below, bargaining at the top”. 
Radical Paradigm. According to the Radical Paradigm working through instituions and negotiating 
with incumbent elite would not work at all, so would just waist the social capital of the movement. 
The only way out is to mass mobilization and civil disobedience. 
Table 2 
Differences in Assessing Political Context within the Reform Movement 
 Discursive 
Paradigm 
Institutionalist 
Paradigm 
Activist 
Paradigm 
Radical 
Paradigm 
Optimism toward 
the incumbent 
Elites 
Yes No No No 
Working through 
Institutions 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Pressure from 
Below 
No No Yes Yes 
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Data 
My data consist of comments, speeches, interviews and articles from different active members of the 
Reform Movement between 1997 and 2005. I have used Namayah software for accessing newspapers 
and magazines of these years. Namayah is a selection of articles, reports, interviews etc. from all 
periodical publications for each month. This selection contains 1368 journals, periodicals, newspapers 
and magazines on different political cultural economic and social topics over the eight years of my 
study. Regarding published political materials, Namayah covers important news, speeches, interviews 
and debates in each month. I have reviewed all the political materials in the Namayah and chose any 
material including discussions about opportunity, threat, movement’s strategy, definitions of 
reformism, actors’ political theories, and their normative statements about political activity. It seems 
that there is a good coverage of almost all of each month's important political events and their 
reflections in the print media in Namayeh. In some cases, it even covers important speeches or 
interviews from different sources, when different newspapers or magazines covered political events. 
There are also materials for all three mentioned groups which are of interest for this article, although 
the coverage of students’ opinions is less than the two other groups.  
Fortunately, Iranian Student National News Agency (ISNA) has its archive available online since 
1998, which is the oldest online source for this period. ISNA has covered all the statements of the 
Tahkim and all other reformist political groups in this period, in addition to interviews with many 
reformists and student activists throughout the whole period. 
I have also used other online sources that their archives go back to years 1997-2005. Besides, Persian 
books that got published during reform period were another source of data. These books were either 
collections of articles by some active members of the movement, or a collection of news pieces and 
political statements about some of the most important incidents of the reform period. I have also used 
secondary sources which went through eight years of reform movement. 
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The Literature on the Reform Movement 
Different works have examined the rise and fall of the reform movement. In this section, I will try 
review these works from the perspective of this paper, perceptions of opportunity and threats within 
the Reform movement and its changing coalitions.  
A remarkable number works about the Reform movement have treated threats and opportunities for 
the reform movement in an objective way, as if the scholar knows what the opportunity for the 
movement is, independent from actors’ perceptions. Treating the political context in this way they 
have explained why the movement rose and fell. Some of these works argued that particular 
institutional arrangement of the IRI was an influential factor in the rise of the reform movement and 
president Khatami. IRI Constitution in particular and Iranian political structure in general are a 
combination of democratic and non-democratic institutions. According to these works the rise of the 
reform movement was the revival of the democratic element of the Constitution and institutional 
arrangements. The heterogeneity of the IRI elite and their unstable and changing coalitions has been 
also another factor of the political context that explains the emergence of reformism in Iran44. 
The institutional arrangement of the IRI has been also referred to as a factor contributing in the failure 
or fall of the movement. Different authors argued that non-democratic institutions, according to 
Constitution, are more powerful than democratic institutions. The main power according to the 
Constitution and in reality is the Leader. He controls the military and Police Force, National Radio 
and TV, Judiciary, and the Guardian Council. Guardian Council supervises all the elections in Iran 
and decides who can or cannot run for office in each election. It also has veto power over all 
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parliament enactments. As a result elected institutions such as president and parliament are left with a 
very limited power comparing with non-democratic institutions which were controlled by 
conservatives45. The formation of the modern middle class, besides, has been a factor to explain the 
emergence of the reform movement46. While some of these works have somehow touched the 
subjective aspects of opportunity and threats, by using speeches, statements, interviews, and 
comments of actors, perceptions of actors have not been the focus of these studies. 
In addition to these works about institutions, elites, and society, there are also some works that have 
examined more subjective and ideational aspects of the reform movement. Some of these works have 
concentrated on the reformist discourse, how ideas such as democracy, freedom, and civil society 
were articulated in this discourse, and how this articulation was crucial in the rise of the movement47. 
In some other works, also, it was argued that this was reformist discourse that disabled them to 
confront hardliners48. These works explain the strategic choice of the movement based on how 
Khatami and other reformists articulated and framed their goals and ideals. The point that is missing 
here is again reformists’ understanding of their political context, the ramifications of this 
understanding in their strategic choice, and the variation within movement regarding their perceptions 
of opportunity and threats. 
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Finally there are couples of works that refer to reformists’ strategy as a factor contributing to the 
failure of the movement. These works single out the movements’ lack of an overall strategy, 
negligence about forging connections with civil society, and failing to have a dialogue with 
conservative elements in the government and society as major causes in the decline of the 
movement49. While these works do a good job in explaining the role of reformists’ strategic mistakes 
in the failure of the movement, they do not tell us in a systematic why they made these strategic 
choices, and how their assessments of the political context played in these strategic choices or flaws. 
Besides, while some of the mentioned works have reported the clash between students and Khatami, 
there is still no systematic classification of the perceptions of opportunity and threat within the 
movement in these works. Moreover, no work has paid attention to the fact that variation over these 
perceptions even produced tensions and fractures within the student movement. Finally, none of these 
works on the reform movement has examined the importance of diverging and converging 
perceptions of opportunity and threat in changing coalitions within the movement. 
Analysis 
The Life of the Reform Movement can be divided to two phases 1997-1999 and 1999-2005. In the 
first phase period, almost all of the main actors shared a strategic paradigm in assessing political 
opportunity and threat. In the second phase, one can observe that some of the main political groups 
and figures within the movement modified or dramatically changed the paradigm they affiliated with 
during the first phase, while some other just kept with their previous paradigms. In the second period 
we also observe that the main coalition between these political groups disintegrate, and a new 
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coalition emerges. In the following, I will trace actors perceptions, strategic moves, and coalitional 
configurations around major junctures in the life of the reform movement. 
Table 3 
Changing Perceptions of the Political Context within the Reform Movement 
 Student 
Movement 
Clerical 
Reformist Party 
Lay Reformist 
Parties 
Opposition 
Groups 
1997-2000 Discursive 
Paradigm 
Discursive 
Paradigm 
Discursive 
Paradigm 
Activist 
Paradigm 
2000-2005 Radical 
Paradigm 
Discursive 
Paradigm 
Institutionalist 
Paradigm 
Activist 
Paradigm 
 
 
The First Phase (1997-2000) 
1997 Presidential Election and the Subsequent Political Opening 
The catalyst for the appearance of the reform movement was undoubtedly Mohammad Khatami’s 
presidential campaign in 1997 and his landslide and unexpected victory in the elections. Khatami won 
the elections, while the establishment was supporting Khatami’s rival. In spite of this support, 
Khatami gained 20 million votes and became president. In that campaign, Khatami was backed by a 
coalition consisting of 18 groups. After the victory, these groups formed a front called The May 23rd 
Front  (Jebhe-ye-Dovvom-e-Khordad) - May 23rd being the day that Khatami won the elections. The 
Assembly, the Organization of Mojahedin, and the Unity Office were important members of this 
Front.  
Opposition groups such as Iran Liberation Movement and Nationalist-Religious Activists also 
participated in the election. Liberation Movement casted blank ballot in the election, and Religious-
Nationalist Activists implicitly endorsed Khatami. They mentioned the threat of political monopolism 
and totalitarianism as a reason to vote in the election, despite their candidates were not allowed to 
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run50. After Khatami’s victory, these groups supported Khatami’s pro-democracy programs and 
slogans. 
Khatami’s government put into practice liberalizing policies in the political and cultural spheres. As a 
result of these policies, a new generation of press came into being which was at the forefront of the 
reform movement and at that time acted as its most important component. Press hotly discussed 
issues such as democracy, civil society, human rights, and criticized authoritarian tendencies and 
policies within IRI. Also, student activities in university campuses increased their activities and held 
many open discussion meetings for students, protest gatherings, and other types of activities. 
In the second year of Khatami’s presidency, his government held elections for Urban and Rural 
Councils for the first time in the IRI. In these elections, half a million candidates competed for 35,000 
Rural Councils and 900 Urban Councils. The reformists won 80 percent of the seats. The elections 
opened a new sphere for direct decision-making and citizen-participation, and were thus a 
considerable step toward expanding participation and representation in the political regime. 
Discursive Paradigm. During the first three years of the reform movement a certain way of appraising 
political context was more or less dominant within the Reform Movement. This paradigm originates 
in  a certain theory about the trajectories of political development in Iran and a particular reading of 
Iranian history 51. 
According to this reading, Iran has been under despotic rule for centuries. These years of despotism 
have cultivated a despotified culture which is the opposite of the democratic culture. Iranian people, 
then, do not know how to act and react in liberalized atmospheres. Thus, whenever despotism got 
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undermined and political sphere opened a bit, Iranian people would resort to extremism, engage in 
conflictual behavior and fighting with each other, and transform the newly democratic conditions into 
chaos and anarchy which in its turn set the ground for the return of the despotism. President Khatami 
explained this viewpoint in his second year in office as follows: 
“a country’s problems should be viewed in the context of its reality. To assume that country just 
learning democracy should have a similar political culture to that in the West which has had 200-300 
years of experience with democracy, along with the expectations and attitudes that come with it, is 
not right. (Iran) has just begun to practice democracy. Unfortunately these democratic efforts have 
repeatedly failed in the course of history due to two factors. Namely, a mentality influenced by 
despotism. As a result, we face intolerance, impatience, and transformation of differences to violent 
opposition and hostility. These have been the factors that often blocked the people’s movement 
towards the establishment of a popular government and a democratic regime.52” 
President Khatami followed that Iranians suffer from the chronic sickness of despotism and so they 
do not respect the law. According to Khatami, despotism is second nature to Iranians53. 
This particular history of Iranian politics and the lack of democratic values in the Iranian culture 
implied that reform should be followed gradually and through cultivating cultural values of tolerance 
and dialogue. Dialogue and negotiation then should be a major means for democratization. This 
emphasis on centrality of dialogue and negotiation was also based on optimism toward the elite of the 
IRI. It was hoping that reformists would persuade conservative opponents of reform to give up their 
resistance and give way to democratization. In an instant, president Khatami mentioned that “We 
have no other path except moderation and dialogue”54. A newspaper affiliated with Lay Reformist 
Parties writing about president Khatami and his opponents described him as “somebody who is trying 
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to convince a person not to commit a suicide, and Khatami does not have any choice other than 
repeating his argument”55.  
In addition to this optimistic presumption toward the incumbent elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran –
that these opponents of the reform would be convinced through dialogue- it was also believed that the 
institutions of the regime particularly elections were receptive toward reformism or had the capacity 
for reforming the regime from within, and following reformist demands outside legal institutions 
equated violence, chaos, and riot56. As a reformist journalist in that time affiliated with Lay Reformist 
parties explained this idea, “The Islamic Republic of Iran is a regime without impasse… in order to 
change the world there is no way other than acting within legal institutions”57. 
Furthermore, in line with this major emphasis on the electoral mobilization and working through legal 
institutions, this paradigm was reluctant about mass mobilization. The main fear was that mass 
mobilization would involve emotional agitation, emotional explosion would give way to extremism, 
and this in turn would give an excuse for repression to hardliners. The reasoning was that the 
grievances in the society are high, so it could have been exploded easily. In addition, Iranian civil 
society is weak and reform movement also lacked the organizational capacity to control marches, 
demonstrations and gathering. Explaining this argument which in a sense resonated “mass society” 
theory of the collective behavior, a reformist newspaper affiliated with Lay Reformist Parties wrote, 
for instance, “in mass gathering extremist people always take the position of leaders and lead the 
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crowed, people who tell the most radical slogans and agitate the feelings and emotions. That’s what 
the psychology of masses tells us”58.  
Hence, the call for being patience, moderate, rational, unemotional was a recurrent theme in this 
paradigm, and reformist supporters were urged to “beware of leftism and Anarchism, and not to give 
excuse for repression to the opponents of reform”59. Analogies from recent history of Iran were also 
extracted to show how radicalism and extremism have damaged democratic movements in the past60. 
What is important in this section is how Discursive Paradigm as a certain theoretical framework 
functioned in reformists’ appraisal of the political context. Interestingly, this paradigm had 
similarities to theories of democratization that emphasize on civic political culture as a prerequisite 
for democracy, theories of mass society, and the theory of Autocratic Rule in the history of Iran. 
 
While lay and clerical reformist parties advocated the Discursive Paradigm and student movement 
also abided by this paradigm, Liberation Movement and Religious-Nationalist activists had a different 
understanding of the situation. They frequently featured the example of Mohammad Mosaddeq, Iran’s 
prime minister and the leader of the National Movement, who nationalized the oil in 1950 while just a 
minority in the Iranian Parliament supported him. Mosaddeq took the opportunity to mobilize masses, 
and by mobilizing popular support forced his opponents who were better positioned in governmental 
institutions to give way to his programs61. This reading of the Iranian history was in contradiction 
with the historical reading of the Discursive Paradigm that associated mass mobilization with 
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extremism, chaos, and the return of dictatorship. In fact, oppositional groups were urging Khatami to 
take a more confrontational stance toward the incumbent elite and also to benefit from mass 
mobilization tactics. 
Conservative Resistance and Repression 
Resistance to reformist policies and repression of reformists started somehow from the first year. 
Hardliners tried to block the movement’s democratizing attempts in different ways including limited 
disqualification of reformist candidates in elections, arresting and harassing reformist prominent 
figures, attacking protest gatherings, and closing reformist press. 
In one of the first episodes of conservative resistance, when in the election for the Council of Experts 
in 1998, the Guardian Council disqualified many reformist clerics to run for the election, Khatami 
tried to solve the problem through negotiation with the Leader, and he apparently failed62. 
In line with these efforts to deal with resistances through negotiation, in different occasions, 
reformists demobilized their supporters and tried to discourage them from a popular encounter with 
hardliners. Two important incidents were arrest of Mohsen Kadivar, a dissident cleric, and Abdollah 
Nori, a prominent reformist and the former minister of Interior in Khatami’s government. After 
Kadivar’s arrest in 1999, the student movement had organized gatherings in university campuses all 
over the country, in protest to the arrest of Kadivar. Reformist press affiliated with lay reformist 
parties, though, wrote about hardliners’ plot for a massive bloodshed in those gatherings and finally 
convinced student leaders to cancel the event. Similarly, after the arrest of Nuri in 1999, lay reformist 
parties and activists argued that “Nuri’s arrest might be a plan to agitate emotions and we should not 
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give the opportunity to repression. Thus, at this time any gathering will serve the interests of 
authoritarians”63. 
At the same time opposition groups had a different appraisal of the conditions and called for different 
reactions. As an illustration, when the reformist mayor of Tehran was arrested in 1998, a monthly 
associated with the opposition groups wrote: 
“The biggest source of the power for the president is 20 million votes, so he should think of ways to 
make this potential force real… President should talk to people through interviews, lectures, and 
gatherings in National holidays.  
When president invites the people the police will not allow the militia to attack the crowed. This way 
he even prevents the eruption of emotions”64. 
Beside arrestment of major reformist, the major incident of crackdown occurred when on July 8th 
1999, militia and police raided student dormitories in the University of Tehran. This raid was 
followed by sit-ins in the Tehran University campus, a series of scattered and uncoordinated 
demonstrations, and riots in universities and main squares in cities like Tehran and Tabriz which 
continued until July 12th. Protests were suppressed brutally and many students were arrested during 
this episode. While different reformist actors condemned the violence against students, they also 
sought to placate angry students65. The main student movement organization, also, while condemned 
the violence tried to control the students and prevent them from radicalization66. 
Resistance to the movement continued after reformists’ landslide victory in 1999 parliamentary 
election and even was severed. Saeed Hajjarian, the deputy speaker of the Tehran municipality was 
shot in the face. He survived the attempt albeit incapacitated. 
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Couple of months later, in March 2000, the Judiciary closed dozens of reformist press.  This was a big 
damage to the movement, because reformist press was one of the major pillars of the movement. This 
aggressive move by hardliners again did not result in a big and immediate paradigm shift by reformist 
parties and student movement organization.  
In reaction to this aggressive move, Unity Office planned to organize protest gatherings and marches 
in Tehran and other cities67. However, the reformist Ministry of Interior declined their request for 
having a march68, and students sufficed to silent protest gatherings on university campuses.  
Right after that one of the lay reformist parties issued an important statement and urged all reformists 
to pursue the strategy of “active tranquility.” They again compared “July 8th” – an actualized threat- 
with the events around the attempted assassination of Hajjarian – an avoided threat. They argued that 
after the attempt on Hajjarian people did not go to streets, and by avoiding polarization and unrest 
reformists did not give an excuse for crackdown to hardliners. They emphasized that reformists 
should defend the demands of the movement while keeping tranquility and avoiding turmoil. They 
also suggested that reformists should provide a clear image of the reformism to the legitimizing 
centers of the Regime69. Unity Office was one of the first groups that followed the strategy of Active 
Tranquility by that time70. 
1999 parliamentary election 
These repressive measures by the hardliners did not lead to a sudden and dramatic paradigm shift on 
behalf of the reformist parties and student movement organization. The optimism toward reforming 
the regime through legal institutions followed even after the event of July 8th. The major 
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crystallization of this continuance was the participation of all different reformist actors including the 
student movement in the parliamentary election in 2000. Similar to previous election student 
movement acted in cooperation with other reformist parties and had even some candidates of its own. 
Reformists won the majority of the parliament in this election and the Unity Office also got some 
seats in the parliament. 
As mentioned in the theoretical discussion, movement actors not only asses the context in the present 
and future, they also appraise past events in the political context. July 8th and all elections from 1997 
to 2000 were events that became the subject of retrospective assessments. As an actualized threat July 
8th was recalled by lay reformist parties as an incident that masses went to the streets and served the 
interests of hardliners by giving them an excuse for cracking down on the movement71. Elections 
were also recalled as incidents that movement pursued its demands through ballot boxes and 
succeeded72. The conclusion was that the advantage of the movement was in electoral institutions 
rather than in mass mobilization73. 
6th Parliament started on May 7th. Reformists still had this hope that through negotiations and 
dialogue can deal with conservative institutions such as the Guardian Council74 that according to the 
Constitution had the right to veto parliamentary bills. 
In instances that echoed a still lasting optimism toward conservative elites, dialogue was still 
mentioned as the best means to smooth the path toward democratization75. The transitology literature 
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on democratization was even cited to show the centrality of negotiation and elite settlement in 
democratic transitions. Sohrab Razzaqi, a deputy of the reformist Ministry of Interior affiliated with 
lay reformist parties suggested that,  
“We need elite settlement. All countries that have been successful in transition to democracy have 
had elite settlement. Elite settlement has been the heart of the reformist strategy. Elite settlement is a 
process through which rival leaders and political forces work through the leverage of negotiation and 
bargaining to push the reform project and based on this they define their future relationships and 
accommodate on certain rules of the game”76. 
Having parliament and executive under reformist control, reformist parties stressed that these 
institutions were still the best opportunities to follow reform77. The movement could not use the 
capacity of their supporters except in elections, because this was just a shapeless mass and it was very 
likely that any popular gathering lead to violence78.  
Again similar to works in transitiology literature and the revolution literature, reformists parties 
argued that acts of violence, mass mobilization and revolutionary methods could not bring about 
democracy79. On different occasions, they also referred to instances of the Iranian history, in the 
Constitutional Revolution, and the Nationalization of Oil (1950-53) when radicalism aborted 
democratization process80. 
To sum up, one can see reformist parties and the student movement organization more or less shared 
the same paradigm in assessing the political context. Resonating with some academic social science 
theories, this paradigm, Discursive Paradigm was based on optimism toward the incumbent elite and 
political institutions such as elections and pessimism about the percussions of the mass mobilization. 
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Opposition groups, as we saw, did not share this paradigm with other reformist actors. Finally, 
instances of repression did not immediately make reformist actors to revise or reject the paradigm 
they were using. 
The Second Phase (2000-2005) 
New Paradigms in the Movement (2000-2001) 
Whereas reformists had put lots of hope in capturing legislature, some of these hopes turned to 
disillusionment when Guardian Council vetoed different pro-democratic parliamentary bills and other 
repressive measures toward reformist journalists, intellectuals, and activists continued. In tandem 
with these closures in the political context a new paradigm became more visible in public debates 
within the movement. This paradigm was advocated by opposition groups and some other individual 
reformist intellectuals and strategists81. 
Activist Paradigm. The first and most important point about this paradigm was that, it did not share 
the optimistic view toward reforming the system just through governmental institutions and electoral 
politics. Optimistic hopes in transforming the opponents through sympathy would not work, if not 
accompanied by popular pressure.  
In this paradigm, the Reform Movement was seen as a grass-roots social movement82. The successes 
of the movement have been because of its grass-roots base, and the only way to success is to work on 
the pressure from below and the popular force of the movement83. Thus, to promote the reformist 
causes, it would be necessary to take the opportunity to organize and mobilize the supporters. The 
main proposed strategy in this paradigm was “pressure from below and bargaining at the top,” 
formulated by Sa’eed Hajjarian. In contrast to tendency in Discursive and Institutionalist Paradigms 
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to elitism, Hajjarian had a different understanding of power: “We should not see the power at the top. 
The power is distributed in the bottom. When people in the bottom find each other, a micro-
mobilization occurs”84. For him, the government was the fruit of the movement not its creator85. 
This paradigm had also reflections on the past. It was argued that the failure of the movement began 
when it just concentrated on bargaining at the top and lost its privilege in the “pressure from below”86. 
Moreover, the fact that Khatami refrained in different occasions to confront hardliner and lead his 
supporters to encounter them was also criticized and was mentioned as another instance of missing 
opportunity: “expressing hope is not enough, Khatami should resist hardliners, use his 20 million 
backbone and talk explicitly to them”87. This was in fact a critique of the optimistic assumption about 
conservative elites of IRI.  
 
Institutionalist Paradigm. In addition to the rise of the activist paradigm, another subtle but important 
paradigm shift also occurred when fifteen months after proposing the strategy of Active Tranquility, 
the Organization of Mujahidin called for following the new strategy of Active Deterrence. In this new 
strategy, Mujahidin accepted that the hope in rationalizing the opponents have not worked and it 
urged reformist elite in the Executive and Legislature to voice their opposition toward hard-liners’ 
crackdown on reformist activists88. Lay reformist parties were the main groups that pursued this 
strategy and took a challenger stance toward hardliners. This paradigm kept the premise of 
plausibility of working through institutions, and implausibility of mass mobilization, but rejected the 
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optimism toward IRI elite. Lay reformist parties, who advocated this paradigm, later used their 
official ranks to attack judiciary and other non-electoral governmental institutions. 
This subtle shift is important because it was a relative convergence toward the Activist Paradigm that 
was urging for a more confrontational approach. We will see later how this convergence played in 
later coalitional changes within the movement. 
2002 Municipality Elections 
Slightly before the second municipalities’ elections, the Unity Office signaled its departure from the 
Discursive and Institutionalist Paradigms. Unity Office had worked in coordination with clerical and 
lay reformists advocating aforementioned paradigms until 2001, but in September 2001, it indicated 
in its final resolution of the annual meeting that, 
“accepting the general paradigm of reformism, we have brought up our criticisms of the status quo. 
According to our analysis the capacities of the current discourse of reformism – that started in May 
23rd - is getting exhausted and many of its assumption have been tarnished”89. 
Unity Office, then did not issue a list of candidate in the municipality elections in February 2003, 
while Clerical and Lay reformist parties and opposition groups both participated in this election90. 
These groups affiliated with Discursive, Institutionalist and Activist paradigms and all shared the 
perception of these elections as an opportunity for pushing forward reforms. Besides, based on 
reformist landslide victories four elections from 1997 to 2001, there was not so much talk in this 
election about the threat of hardliners capturing the municipalities.  
Nonetheless, the turnout and the results of the polls took the participant reformist actors by surprise. 
The turn-out in the election was very low over throughout the country, especially in Tehran, and 
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hardliners ended winning the municipalities. Mahmud Ahmadi-nejad was elected as the mayor of 
Tehran after this election.  
The important point here is that, the threat was in fact present in this period, but since actors had won 
all the elections since 1997, they did not perceive the imminent danger of hardliners capturing the 
municipalities. This point speaks to the literature about threat and coalition. Indeed, what is important 
is not the objective threat but the perception of threat that contributes in coalition-making between 
movement actors. 
Shortly after the election Unity Office announced its departure from the May 23rd Front since it did 
not see this front efficient anymore and their decision to launch the new “All-inclusive Democracy 
Front” [Jebhe-ye faragir-e demokrasi]. This departure was based on diverging assessment of Unity 
Office of the political context from other reformist actors in the May 23rd Front. Office Unity argued 
that reform from within would not be efficient anymore. The movement would need then a new 
strategy and so a new coalition to work that strategy out: 
“Talking about the inefficiency of the May 23rd Front is based on this reality that the strategy of “self-
reforming” of the regime has faced a blockade. Of course this does not just go back to the weaknesses 
of the reformists, but the fact that the hard cores of power do not surrender to the process of reform 
has been one of the serious causes of this blockade”91.  
Radical Paradigm. A few months before this statement of Unity Office, Akbar Ganji, a reformist 
journalist formerly advocating the discursive paradigm, wrote his Republican Manifesto in the Evin 
Prison that was suggesting of the emergence of the radical paradigm. In this new paradigm, IRI was 
not reformable. The institutional arrangement of the regime was so inherently authoritarian that 
would render reform from within the regime impossible. Working within legal institutions, then, 
could not result in anything other than wasting the social capital of the movement, as was observed in 
the low turn-out in the municipality election. The only way out was to boycott governmental 
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institution and struggle for establishment of a full-fledged secular republic through methods of civil 
disobedience. Ganji argued in detail in his Manifesto that reforming the regime within the framework 
of the Constitution was not possible. Ali Afshari, a prominent member of Tahkim, also brought up 
this point among others: 
“Struggling to reform an unreformable system is futile. In an inflexible power structure and 
sociopolitical configuration that has not left any hope for submission to the will of people, could one 
talk about the political action within the framework of reformism?92”. 
Instead, radical paradigm highlighted the importance of the pressure from below. They shared this 
critique with activist paradigm that failure of reformism to an extent has been because of their failure 
in organizing and mobilizing their constituencies93. However, the pressure from below was the only 
way of democratization and they rejected any positive role for having representatives in governmental 
institutions94. Their argument against the presence in the government was that structural constraints 
would not let the reformists to be effective in the government. As a result they would not be able to 
keep their promise and would lose people’s trust in them95.  
One can notice how similar this argument is to Piven’s and Claword’s classic argument in social 
movement literature. They argued that the only means conducive to positive outcome for movements 
is disruption, and working through institutions would lead to cooptation of movement leaders96. 
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2004 Parliamentary Elections and the Proposal for Constitutional Amendment 
In 2004 parliamentary elections, many reformist candidates who registered for the elections got 
disqualified by the Guardian Council. Khatami and Mahdi Karrubi, the speaker of the parliament, 
tried to solve the problem through negotiation with the Leader97. Lay reformist parties, though, 
expected Khatami to take a more confrontational stance and refuse carrying out the elections. Finally 
when the elections carried out, lay reformist parties did not participate in this election, while Khatami, 
Karrubi and the clerical reformist party participated and invited people to participate in the election. 
This election was an important point in terms of drawing a line between lay reformist parties and 
Institutionalist paradigm on the one hand, and clerical reformist party and the Discursive paradigm, 
on the other hand.  
 
In the aftermath of this election, seven activists including four top member of Unity Office issued a 
statement asking for a referendum to change the Constitution. They launched a website on internet 
under the title of “Sixty Million Signatures” and asked people to sign their petition98. 
This proposition did not fly within other reformist actors. Not only groups affiliated with 
Institutionalism rejected the idea of a referendum for Constitutional change, but also figures 
associated with Activism criticized it. Hajjarian criticized them because of what he called the unfit 
between their means and ends. He questioned if they had the capacity to change the Constitution, 
called them delusional, and compared them with messianic movements in terms of unfit between 
means and ends99. Similarly Ebrahim Yazdi, the secretary general of Liberation Movement, one of the 
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opposition groups, also argued that if the movement had the capacity to mobilize people then it would 
not need to change the legal structure,  
“because with this popular power, one can reform the structure. In England, the queen has the legal 
right to close the parliament and fire the prime minister but political forces do not let her do that. 
People who seek to change the Constitution and the legal structure should explain with which power 
leverage they are going to do so”100. 
What was in fact at the heart of the debates about the Constitutional referendum was whether 
realizing the Constitutional referendum was possible or not, or there was an opportunity for that. In 
fact, perceptions of opportunity mattered in themselves in this juncture. A group such as Liberation 
Movement was a political party that has been critical toward the content of the Constitution and some 
of its core doctrines since its ratification. Its members had been also subject of state repression in 
different occasions, and were banned from running for office in 1980s and 1990s. However, all these 
factors did not make Liberation Movement to line up with radical proposers of the Constitutional 
Change who as well were critical toward the Constitution and were target of repression.  
Then a few months before 2005 presidential elections the configuration reformist actors’ alliances 
within the reform movement had completely changed. Lay reformist parties had broken up with the 
reformist clerical party over a debate about the possibility of confronting hardliners in 2004 
parliamentary elections, and opposition groups had lined up with the lay reformist parties about the 
implausibility of having a constitutional referendum. 
2005 Presidential election 
In 2005 presidential election, different perceptions of opportunity and threats crystallized in different 
positions toward election. Mahdi Karrubi’s candidacy, backed by clerical reformist party, represented 
discursive paradigm, as he emphasized in his campaign that he was a good bargainer and could 
pursue the reform through negotiations. Lay reformist parties nominated Mostafa Mo’een, and stated 
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that if he got qualified to run, they would participate101.  They described the election as an opportunity 
for resuscitating and empowering the movement102. Mo’een from the beginning revealed his 
confrontational approach and said he would not carry out elections such as 2004 parliamentary 
elections. 
Opposition groups affiliated with the activist paradigm such also said they would participate if their 
candidate got qualified, and described the elections as an opportunity for democratization103. When 
their candidate got disqualified by Guardian Council, after a few rounds of negotiations with the lay 
reformist parties, opposition groups supported Mo’een’s candidacy. To clarify this decision, they 
pointed to the threat that they perceived in unification of sovereignty under hardliner’s rule. They 
stated that boycotting the election in practice will serve the benefit of the incumbent authoritarian 
faction and would let them to capture the executive without any problem104:  
“If we do not participate in the election, the right faction will win the election and then they will make 
a disaster for the country, that we can observe in the behavior of the mayor of Tehran [Mahmud 
Ahmadi-nejad]” 105. 
While lay reformist parties shared this notion of threat with opposition groups, they also noticed that 
they needed new allies in elections, when they observed the low turnout in 2003 municipality 
elections, and after they broke up with the clerical reformist party in 2004 parliamentary elections. 
Groups and figures affiliated with the radical paradigm such as Unity office, nonetheless, boycotted 
the election. They argued that the legal regime in Iran was the main obstacle to reform106. Even in 
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case of a free election this power structure would not allow the elected president to fulfill his 
promises and this would erode the social capital of the movement107. Finally, hardliners needed this 
vote to legitimize their rule, so movement should abstain its vote and delegitimize the regime108. They 
were of the opinion that this is a more efficient way to pursue democratization109. 
Organizational tension within Unity Office. Although Unity Office was the most important group 
endorsing boycott, this view toward the election was not shared within all of the subunits of the Unity 
Office. A significant minority in subunits of the Unity Office either endorsed Mo’een’s candidacy or 
just supported participating in the election110. In an argument very similar to the classic political 
opportunity thesis in social movement literature, these student activists argued that a fracture in the 
sovereignty would open the political space in the bottom, and there was still opportunities within the 
system to reform it from the within. He said that activists needed a force within the government to 
interact with hardliners111.  
What is important here is that divergence over assessments of political context not only can contribute 
in fractures within movement coalitions, but also they can lead to tensions within social movement 
organizations, tensions which undermine their efficacy to act as a unified collective actor. The 
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evidence about tensions within the Unity Office indicates that one cannot reduce disagreements over 
perceived opportunity and threat to mobilizational structure or organizational membership.  
Table 4 
Key Moments in the life of the Reform Movement 
Perceptions, Actions, and Changing Coalitions 
 Reformist 
Clerical Party 
Reformist Lay 
Parties 
Student Movement Opposition 
Groups 
 
1997      
Presidential 
Election 
Supporting 
Khatami 
Supporting 
Khatami 
Supporting Khatami Participating in 
the Election 
 
Arrest of the 
Refirnust Mayor 
of Tehran 
[Karbaschi] 
Khatami trying 
to solve the 
problem through 
negotiation 
  Suggesting to 
Khatami to rely 
on people in 
dealing with 
this crisis 
 
1998      
Municipalities 
Election 
Participation as 
a member of 
May 23rd Front 
Participation as a 
member of May 
23rd Front 
Participation as a 
member of May 23rd 
Front 
  
Arrest of 
Kadivar 
  Organizing protests 
all over the country 
but then canceling 
them after people 
affiliated with 
Reformist Lay 
Parties encouraged 
them to do so 
  
July 7th 
(18 Tir) 
Condemning 
Violence against 
students and 
inviting students 
to calmness 
Condemning 
Violence against 
students and 
inviting students to 
calmness 
Protesting against 
violence and trying 
to control the crowd 
at the same time 
  
2000      
Parliamentary 
election 
Participation as 
a member of 
May 23rd Front 
Participation as  
members of May 
23rd Front 
Participation as a 
member of May 23rd 
Front 
Participation 
with their own 
list of 
Candidate 
 
Shut-down of 
reformist Press 
 Suggesting Active 
Tranquility 
Limiting their 
protests within 
University 
campuses and 
abiding by Active 
Tranquility 
  
2001      
Presidential Supporting Supporting Supporting Khatami Supporting  
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Election Khatami Khatami Khatami 
 Emphasizing on 
Moderation and 
avoiding 
extremism 
Suggesting Active 
Deterrence (taking 
a confrontational 
stance within 
institutions) 
Stating that 
reformist discourse 
is tarnished 
  
2002      
Municipalities 
Elections 
Participation 
with a separate 
list 
Participation with 
a separate list 
Not Participating in 
the Elections, and 
Leaving May 23rd 
Front After the 
Elections 
Participation 
with a separate 
list 
 
2004      
Parliamentary 
Elections 
Participation Not Participation Not Participation Not 
Participation 
 
The Proposal for 
Constitutional 
Referendum 
Rejection Rejection Endorsing Rejection  
2005      
Presidential 
Election 
Majma’ 
supporting 
Karrubi 
Supporting 
Mo’een 
The Majority of 
Subunits and the 
Central Committee 
Boycotting, and a 
Minority Endorsing 
Mo’een 
Supporting 
Mo’een 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The Iranian Reform movement started its campaign for democratizing political power in Iran with a 
coalition between the clerical reformist party, lay reformist parties, and the student movement. These 
three actors all shared the discursive paradigm in assessing the political context and making strategic 
choices. During the later political development, Unity Office the main organization of the student 
movement rejected the discursive paradigm and took a radical stance. They stated that there is no 
opportunity in working within institutions and negotiating with political elites. They left the coalition 
in 2002. Lay reformist parties also dropped their optimism toward political elite and broke up with the 
clerical reformist party. This paradigm shift brought them closer to the opposition groups. Opposition 
groups did not totally reject working within institutions. They maintained that working within 
48 
 
institutions should be accompanied with pressure from below. Lay reformist parties and opposition 
groups formed a coalition in 2005 presidential elections, while the clerical reformist party endorsed 
another candidate, and the Unity office boycotted the election. As I argued, goals, repression, and 
organization cannot explain this new coalitional configuration. If similar goals and repression were 
determinant factors opposition groups should have lined up with the student movement. Also, if 
perceptions could be reduced to organizational factors Unity office would not have witnessed the 
internal tension between units that followed the organization official policy and units that followed 
the coalition of the opposition groups and the lay reformist parties. One cannot understand the new 
coalitional configuration unless taking into account the new landscape of the perceived opportunities 
and threats. 
The case of multiple perceptions of opportunity and threat is a scenario that is downplayed by the 
scholars of social movements. This paper takes this scenario seriously and argues that perceptions of 
opportunity and threat are complex and the subject of debate between movement actors. In this sense 
movement actors are very similar to movement scholars who try to figure out different dimensions of 
the concept and identify it in different contexts. The similarity appears even bigger, when we observe 
that actors’ perceptions engage theories of mass society, democratization, social movements and so 
on. 
Finally, this paper contends that treating political opportunities and threats objectively in explanations 
of coalition building or fragmentation within social movements leaves us with unsolved puzzles. To 
understand these processes better I proposed to take the perceptions into account. Converging and 
diverging perceptions of opportunity and threat are part of the formation and disintegration of 
coalitions within social movements. 
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